curl --request POST \
--url https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal \
--header 'Authorization: Bearer <token>' \
--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '
{
"name": "NPM_TOKEN",
"value": "npm_..."
}
'import requests
url = "https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal"
payload = {
"name": "NPM_TOKEN",
"value": "npm_..."
}
headers = {
"Authorization": "Bearer <token>",
"Content-Type": "application/json"
}
response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)
print(response.text)const options = {
method: 'POST',
headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer <token>', 'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({name: 'NPM_TOKEN', value: 'npm_...'})
};
fetch('https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal', options)
.then(res => res.json())
.then(res => console.log(res))
.catch(err => console.error(err));<?php
$curl = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($curl, [
CURLOPT_URL => "https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal",
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 30,
CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "POST",
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => json_encode([
'name' => 'NPM_TOKEN',
'value' => 'npm_...'
]),
CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => [
"Authorization: Bearer <token>",
"Content-Type: application/json"
],
]);
$response = curl_exec($curl);
$err = curl_error($curl);
curl_close($curl);
if ($err) {
echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
} else {
echo $response;
}package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"net/http"
"io"
)
func main() {
url := "https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal"
payload := strings.NewReader("{\n \"name\": \"NPM_TOKEN\",\n \"value\": \"npm_...\"\n}")
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", url, payload)
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
req.Header.Add("Content-Type", "application/json")
res, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
defer res.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
fmt.Println(string(body))
}HttpResponse<String> response = Unirest.post("https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body("{\n \"name\": \"NPM_TOKEN\",\n \"value\": \"npm_...\"\n}")
.asString();require 'uri'
require 'net/http'
url = URI("https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal")
http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)
http.use_ssl = true
request = Net::HTTP::Post.new(url)
request["Authorization"] = 'Bearer <token>'
request["Content-Type"] = 'application/json'
request.body = "{\n \"name\": \"NPM_TOKEN\",\n \"value\": \"npm_...\"\n}"
response = http.request(request)
puts response.read_body{
"handle": "sealed_Zm9yLWV4YW1wbGUtb25seS1ub3QtYS1yZWFsLWhhbmRsZQ",
"name": "NPM_TOKEN",
"length": 40,
"expires_at": "2026-06-01T01:00:00.000Z"
}{
"error": "prompt_required"
}{
"error": "missing_bearer",
"message": "Authorization required"
}{
"error": "missing_scope",
"required_scope": "sessions:read"
}{
"error": "secret_exists",
"message": "NPM_TOKEN is already stored in this workspace, so nothing was sealed.",
"name": "NPM_TOKEN"
}{
"error": "secret_value_too_large",
"max_bytes": 65536
}{
"error": "seal_rate_limited",
"message": "Too many values were sealed in the last hour or still wait to be proposed.",
"open": 30,
"last_hour": 31
}Seal a value to propose later
Takes a value and answers with a single-use handle.
curl --request POST \
--url https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal \
--header 'Authorization: Bearer <token>' \
--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '
{
"name": "NPM_TOKEN",
"value": "npm_..."
}
'import requests
url = "https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal"
payload = {
"name": "NPM_TOKEN",
"value": "npm_..."
}
headers = {
"Authorization": "Bearer <token>",
"Content-Type": "application/json"
}
response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)
print(response.text)const options = {
method: 'POST',
headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer <token>', 'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({name: 'NPM_TOKEN', value: 'npm_...'})
};
fetch('https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal', options)
.then(res => res.json())
.then(res => console.log(res))
.catch(err => console.error(err));<?php
$curl = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($curl, [
CURLOPT_URL => "https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal",
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 30,
CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "POST",
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => json_encode([
'name' => 'NPM_TOKEN',
'value' => 'npm_...'
]),
CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => [
"Authorization: Bearer <token>",
"Content-Type: application/json"
],
]);
$response = curl_exec($curl);
$err = curl_error($curl);
curl_close($curl);
if ($err) {
echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
} else {
echo $response;
}package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"net/http"
"io"
)
func main() {
url := "https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal"
payload := strings.NewReader("{\n \"name\": \"NPM_TOKEN\",\n \"value\": \"npm_...\"\n}")
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", url, payload)
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
req.Header.Add("Content-Type", "application/json")
res, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
defer res.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
fmt.Println(string(body))
}HttpResponse<String> response = Unirest.post("https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body("{\n \"name\": \"NPM_TOKEN\",\n \"value\": \"npm_...\"\n}")
.asString();require 'uri'
require 'net/http'
url = URI("https://api.reasonmachines.com/v3/organizations/{orgId}/secrets/seal")
http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)
http.use_ssl = true
request = Net::HTTP::Post.new(url)
request["Authorization"] = 'Bearer <token>'
request["Content-Type"] = 'application/json'
request.body = "{\n \"name\": \"NPM_TOKEN\",\n \"value\": \"npm_...\"\n}"
response = http.request(request)
puts response.read_body{
"handle": "sealed_Zm9yLWV4YW1wbGUtb25seS1ub3QtYS1yZWFsLWhhbmRsZQ",
"name": "NPM_TOKEN",
"length": 40,
"expires_at": "2026-06-01T01:00:00.000Z"
}{
"error": "prompt_required"
}{
"error": "missing_bearer",
"message": "Authorization required"
}{
"error": "missing_scope",
"required_scope": "sessions:read"
}{
"error": "secret_exists",
"message": "NPM_TOKEN is already stored in this workspace, so nothing was sealed.",
"name": "NPM_TOKEN"
}{
"error": "secret_value_too_large",
"max_bytes": 65536
}{
"error": "seal_rate_limited",
"message": "Too many values were sealed in the last hour or still wait to be proposed.",
"open": 30,
"last_hour": 31
}secrets_propose tool, so the value never passes through the model. The Reason CLI sends a command’s output here (<command> | reason secrets seal NAME). A handle works once, only for the name it was sealed for and only in this workspace, and expires after 60 minutes; the value is deleted when it is used or expires. What else a handle is bound to depends on the credential that sealed it. Sealed with an API key or a login (this operation’s documented credentials): the handle is a bearer handle within the workspace, bound to the workspace, the name and the member who sealed it, so only a Session turn acting for that member can propose it (seal_other_member otherwise), from any of their Sessions. Sealed inside a Session with the seal ticket secrets_propose gives the agent: the ticket seals once (a second use answers 409 seal_ticket_used), and the handle is also bound to that Session’s tree, so only that Session, its subagents and the Sessions they created can propose it (seal_other_session otherwise). The value is checked as a proposed secret is: the name must be shaped like a credential (invalid_secret_name), the value must not be empty, hold a NUL byte, exceed the size limit or be an address such as a URL or a connection string (secret_value_is_address), and a name already stored in the workspace answers 409 secret_exists. A sealed value is not masked in transcripts, logs or published text until it is stored as a secret: masking it earlier would let an agent test guesses about it. Seal a command’s output directly so the value is never printed. Set seen_by_model when the value already passed through an agent’s context: the approval card then recommends rotating it, and with session_id (a Session of the caller’s own) the exact value is replaced by a mask in that Session’s stored transcript; scrub reports what was rewritten. Requires secrets:write. The answer never contains the value.
Scope: secrets:writeAuthorizations
Your Reason API key from Settings › API keys. New keys use reason_; legacy ara_ keys remain accepted. Keys are capability-scoped: run, mcp:read, mcp:write, secrets:read, secrets:write, sessions:read, sessions:debug, devices:read, devices:write, devices:use, computers:read, computers:write, ssh:write, knowledge:read, memory:read, memory:write, skills:read, skills:write, pages:read, pages:write, repos:read, repos:write, reviews:read, reviews:write, deployment:read, analytics:read, org:read, org:write, attachments:read, attachments:write, guardrails:read, guardrails:write, network:read, network:write, automations:read, automations:write, agent_auth:read. devices:write, devices:use, computers:read, computers:write, ssh:write, network:read and network:write are opt-in, excluded from default keys. computers:read lists visible cloud and connected computers without waking them or granting execution access. devices:read discovers local Device targets; devices:use separately consents to local execution, so a discover-and-run local workflow needs both. devices:write manages enrollment and device grants; computers:write creates or deletes cloud computers; ssh:write manages retained SSH access. network:read reads the saved workspace network policy; network:write replaces custom allowed hosts and requires a current organization owner/admin. Legacy project PATCH requests containing network_allowed_hosts also require network:write plus their existing run scope and project management permission; saved project hosts do not affect current session egress. Only owners/admins can mint or manage keys with network:write; keys cannot grant themselves more authority. See /docs/network-policies for replacement semantics and runtime applicability. mcp:write manages MCP server configuration only; it does not authorize remote MCP-tool execution. sessions:read reads sessions, including the assistant, reasoning and tool activity in their events. sessions:debug is privileged: only for organization owners/admins, it expands session events to the full diagnostic projection (diagnostic event kinds, status text and raw event metadata).
Body
Response
The value is sealed. handle is shown this once.

